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Troublesome Aspets of Western Influences on
Tribal Justice Systems and Laws

Alex Tallchief Skibine1

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Bar Association asked me to give an “overview of the
colonial process by which tribal written law came to resemble the legal structures
of the states and the federal government” at its annual FBA conference on Federal
Indian law held in Albuquerque, New Mexico.2 This paper is largely an outgrowth
of this presentation.
I am aware that there are some in the academy that have taken tribal
judges to task for being overly influenced by western concepts of justice.3 My goal
here is not to criticize any tribal court system for being influenced by western law,
but to highlight why and how this may have happened, as well as to discuss some
of the problems associated with efforts to “integrate” tribal justice systems into the
United States political system.
The influence of western culture on tribal judicial systems is due to at
least three distinct efforts pursued by the federal government. The first is the
attempt to impose western norms on the structure and process of tribal judicial
decision-making. The second is the attempt to influence the culture of Indian tribes,
and finally, the improper efforts to incorporate or integrate Indian tribes into the
United States. After briefly discussing the efforts at imposing western norms on the
culture and structure of tribal courts, this paper will focus on issues surrounding the
integration of tribes within the United States.
I. Structure and Process
Explaining why the United States started to interfere with the structure of
tribal courts and the process by which tribes develop their own laws, scholar and
tribal judge B.J. Jones, summarized humorously in five words “Blame it on Crow
Dog.”4 Jone’s point was that once the United States government was told by the
Supreme Court in Ex Parte Crow Dog5 that it did not have criminal jurisdiction
over Crow Dog, Congress set out to make sure that the next time around, the white
man’s justice would be applied to such crimes.6 Thus that same year, 1883, the first
Courts of Federal Regulations otherwise known as C.F.R. courts were created by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).7 The original purpose behind the creation

1

Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law. J.D., Northwestern University, 1976.
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Address at the Federal Bar Association Indian Law Conference (April 6 & 7,
2000).
3
See Russell Lawrence Barsh, Putting the Tribe in Tribal Courts: Possible? Desirable?, 8 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 74 (1999).
4
B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and
Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 468 (1998).
5
109 U.S. 556 (1883).
6
The Congress proceeded to enact the Major Crimes Act in 1885, the constitutionality of which was
upheld in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). It seems that what antagonized Congress was
the realization the Crow Dog’s sentence under Sioux Law was not going to be as severe as what his
punishment would have been had he been sentenced in federal court.
7
The legality of the CFR courts was upheld in United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (1888).
2

8/15/18 1:54 AM

2

Tribal Law Journal

Vol. 1

of C.F.R. courts was to supplant the existing tribal mechanisms implementing
“justice” in Indian country.8
Of course, Crow Dog was not the real culprit. Although a lot of the blame
can be directed at Congress, perhaps the greater sinner was the Supreme Court and
its decisions to allow Congress plenary power over Indian affairs by refusing to
judicially review the legality of these acts.9 Eventually, with the 1934 enactment of
the Indian Reorganization Act,10 tribes were allowed to develop their own courts
but because the tribal laws and regulations setting the tribal courts had to be
approved by the BIA, the tribes were under great pressure to incorporate western
types of judicial procedure into their own judicial systems.
An historical overview of all federal legislation that has attempted to
interfere with the autonomy of tribal justice systems is beyond the scope of this
article,11 however the experience of my own tribe, the Osage Tribe of Oklahoma, is
indicative of how pervasive United States’ interference with tribal government was.
It has been estimated that the Osage Tribe now of Oklahoma, but formerly of
Kansas, Missouri, and Arkansas, lost close to 100 million acres as the result of the
colonial process.12 The tribe lost much more than just its lands. It also lost its
constitutional form of government. The Osages had adopted a Constitution in 1881,
which was modeled from a Constitution drafted by the Cherokees, which was
loosely modeled after the United States Constitution, which itself was inspired by
the political model devised by the Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy.13 By the early
1900s the BIA had problems with the members of the Osage Tribal Council, which
had been elected under the 1881 Constitution.14 Therefore, the BIA suspended the
Osage Constitution, fired all the councilmen, and hand picked a new council.15 In
1906, the Congress seemingly endorsed the BIA’s action by enacting a law which
among other things redefined the membership of the tribe, described exactly what
the Osage tribal government was suppose to look like,16 gave the BIA the task of
conducting the tribal elections,17 and some would argue, also gave the BIA the
authority to determine “who” could vote in these now federal elections. It is
obvious that interfering with the structure of the tribal legislature will in turn have
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See Jones, supra note 3, at 470.
See U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
10
25 U.S.C. § 476 (1994).
11
See Douglas B. L. Endreson, The Challenges Facing Tribal Courts Today, 79 JUDICATURE 142
(1995) (providing general historical background on tribal courts); see also Christine Zuni, Strengthening
What Remains, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 20-22 (1997).
12
See generally LOUIS F. BURNS, A HISTORY OF THE OSAGE PEOPLE 242 (1989).
13
There is nothing wrong with adopting such a document. A tribal system can be genuinely tribal and
have borrowed from or build upon the previous experiences of foreign institutions. What is important is
that the borrowing be done by the tribe itself free of any unwarranted influence.
14
See TERRY WILSON, THE UNDERGROUND RESERVATION: OSAGE OIL. 42—44 (1985).
15
See Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110 (1976) (holding that the Department of the Interior did not
have the discretion to arbitrarily decide what constituted the legitimate government of a tribe but should
have instead followed the specific congressional directives). In Harjo, the Department only recognized
the Principal chief of the Creek Nation as the legitimate government of the Creeks and had refused to
acknowledge the legitimacy of the Creek National Council even though such Council had never been
abolished by any Act of Congress. Id. at 1114.
16
See Act of June 28, 1906, 45 Stat. 539.
17
See 25 C.F.R. parts 90.1-.49 (2000).
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an important impact on the tribal justice system as well as the laws, which are
subsequently enacted by the tribe.
II. Interference with Tribal Culture:
One of the most basic interferences with tribal culture that has also had an
impact on the evolution of tribal law was the systematic effort to eradicate Native
languages.18 If I remember correctly, when I first visited the Osage reservation as a
child in the 1950s, in order to publicly speak at official or social functions such as
funerals and weddings, one had to speak in the Osage language. When I came back
to the reservation as an adult, this custom had already vanished. Unfortunately for
some tribes, the United States’ effort to eradicate Indian languages has mostly been
successful. This loss has an important impact on tribal court decisions because as
some of the decisions of the Navajo Supreme Court remind us, some native
concepts of justice can only be expressed in their native tongue.19 The Navajo
Supreme Court has done a great job in not replacing Navajo words with English
ones in the text of their opinions. Instead the Court has kept the native words and
takes great care to fully explain what they mean.20
Other concessions made to the western ways of thinking include the
reliance on the written word at the expense of oral tradition. This does pose a
problem for those tribes whose laws are related to their religion and the religion
requires some aspects of it to remain secret. A second major cultural interference
with tribal justice systems was the attempt to eradicate native religions. It should
not be forgotten that the last effort of the United States cavalry against the tribes
involved a campaign to eradicate Indian religion including the ghost dance and the
sun dance. Some may ask what religion has to do with judicial opinions? I once
heard Justice Austin of the Navajo Supreme Court give a talk on Navajo concepts
of justice. He explained that one could not separate Navajo customary law or what
we would call common law, from some of the Navajo’s fundamental religious
beliefs because these beliefs formed the foundation and were an integral part of the
21
Navajo customary law.
III. Integration and Incorporation:
A. The Nature of the Debate and Why it Matters:

18

See Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with Words: Native Americans’ Continuing Struggle Against
the Suppression of their Languages, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 901 (1999).
19
See Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District, 26 ILR 6083 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1999).
20
See also Means, 26 ILR at 6087 (where the Court made use of the word “Hadane” in order to show
why Navajo tribal courts had criminal jurisdiction over a Sioux Indian who was not formally an
“enrolled” member of the Navajo Nation but had become so associated with the Navajo Nation that he
could under traditional Navajo law be considered a Navajo for the purpose of being subjected to the
jurisdiction of Navajo courts); see generally In re Certified Question II: Navajo Nation v. MacDonald,
16 ILR6086, 6092 (1989)(where the Navajo Nation Supreme Court used the word Naat’aanii in order to
explain why the Navajo political officials have a fiduciary trust and can be suspended when in violation
of this trust).
21
See Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M.L.REV. 175 (1994); see
also Hon. T. Tso, Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation Annual Rep. 1-2 (1988).
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The third element that has a major impact on tribal justice systems is the
efforts aimed at integrating tribal justice systems into the United States political
system. Whether the tribes, as political entities, have been or should be integrated
into the United States political system has been a divisive and difficult issue.22 On
one hand, being a part of the United States system would allow tribal court
decisions to be given full faith and credit by federal and state courts. On the other
hand full faith and credit is a two way street and tribal courts would also have to
recognize the decisions of state and federal courts. Without full faith and credit,
however, non-Indian courts will only enforce tribal court judgments under
principles of comity. Statements made by the Ninth Circuit decision in Wilson v.
Marchington23 highlight the potential problems. In that opinion, the Ninth Circuit
expressed the view that before it will honor a tribal judgment, it reserves the right
to not only decide de novo if the tribal court had jurisdiction but also whether the
tribal court had given due process to the litigant.24 Due process can have very
different connotations in Native American tribal traditions than it does in western
legal tradition.
If courts of another sovereign are allowed to review tribal courts’
decisions, tribal courts might be influenced to conform to the norms of that
sovereign. Some have argued that this has made tribal courts overly concerned with
having their judgments respected by non-Indian courts and it has influenced them
to over rely on western concepts of justice. Some other scholars have responded
that this just demands that tribal judges walk a fine line between the Native
American and Western paradigms of justice.25 To a certain extent, it is true that
decisions such as National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe,26 while on one hand
respectful of tribal courts processes, nevertheless do create a dilemma because they
allow for direct federal court review of tribal court jurisdictional determinations.
Coming to a correct understanding of the place of tribes vis-a-vis the
federal government and the states is also important because these days, many
federal judges have a federalist philosophy. By federalism, I have in mind the
Jeffersonian definition of federalism, which means that central governmental power
should be dispersed and flow to local governments. Tribes as local governments
should benefit from such a devolution of federal power. The courts should adopt a
tripartite form of federalism that should include the federal government, the states
and the Indian nations. Unfortunately for many federal judges, including a majority
of those on the Supreme Court, tribes do not seem to fit neatly in the system and
therefore any devolution of federal power only flows to state institutions.

22

See also Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian Control
Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899 (1998)(arguing against any form of integration into the United
States political system); s_ee generally Robert N. Clinton, _Tribal Courts and the Federal
Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841 (1990).
23
127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997).
24
Id. at 810.
25
See generally B.J. Jones, Tribal Courts: Protectors of the Native Paradigm of Justice, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 87 (1997).
26
471 U.S. 845 (1985)(holding that even though deciding whether a tribal court had jurisdiction over a
civil law suit involving a defendant who was not a member of the tribe presented a federal question
giving federal court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, the non-member defendant still had to exhaust
his remedies in tribal courts before the federal court could hear the case).
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The Supreme Court has been schizophrenic as far as determining the
legitimate place of tribes within the United States political system. At one end, the
Supreme Court in its well known 1881 statement in United States v. Kagama27 took
the position that within the geographic confines of the United States there are only
two sovereigns, the state and the federal government, and all governmental power
has to flow from one or the other. 28 At the other end, around the time of
the Kagama decision, the Supreme Court also decided Talton v. Mayes29 where it
held that when the Cherokee Nation exercised its power to prosecute one of its
members, it was exercising an inherent sovereign power which predated the
existence of the United States Constitution.30
The position of tribes within the federal system also impacts their
relationship with states. Being within a state should not mean that tribes are not at
least equal sovereigns with the states. As recently stated by one scholar, “the
relationship between the states and the tribes should reflect the relationship
between two states as sovereigns within the same system, on the same plane, whose
sovereign spheres do not overlap but influence each other through the federal
political process.”31 Although I realize that some court decisions have said that
tribes have a sovereignty status higher than that of the states,32 my argument does
not take issue with this statement but only asserts that under no condition should
tribes ever accept a degree of sovereignty that is less than the one enjoyed by the
states under the United States Constitution. Recognizing that tribes should have at
least as much sovereignty as the states is important because it structures the kind of
relationship tribal courts will have with state courts.33 Tribes should be allowed to
make compacts with the states on a sovereign-to-sovereign basis.34 The success of
27

118 U.S. 375 (1886).
Id. at 379.
163 U.S. 376 (1896).
30
Id. at 384 (holding that the Cherokee Nation’s government was not bound by the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution which only applies to the federal government and under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the states).
31
See Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United
States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617,
619 (1994). The problem of course is that the states have the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to protect
their rights while the tribes only have their treaties. Unlike Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, history
tells us that treaties can be easily abrogated, broken, or repealed.
32
See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 170 (1981)(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In many
respects, the Indian tribe’s sovereignty over their own members is significantly greater than the State’s
power over their own citizens.”).
33
I spoke about Indian sovereignty in 1978 at a conference in western Washington. I was followed on
the program by the then attorney general for the state of Washington, Slade Gordon who had just won
the Oliphant case in the Supreme Court. He started his presentation by saying that my talk about
sovereignty was not helpful and encouraged the tribes to come into his office and negotiate
“jurisdictional” agreements with him but he also said “when you come, you have to leave your
sovereignty at the door. I am willing to talk to you about Indian jurisdiction which does exist but not
about Indian sovereignty which does not.” He seemed not to have realized that without tribal
sovereignty, there could not be any tribal jurisdiction.
34
I was recently involved in a tribal state forum between tribal and state judges in Utah. This forum,
originally created with seed money from a Justice Department grant, is aimed at promoting a working
relationship between tribal and state courts and has enabled tribal and state judges to begin drafting
various agreements and memorandums of understanding aimed at coordinating activities as well as
resolving some of the outstanding issues between state and tribal courts. This can be and has been in
some cases a very worthwhile and productive endeavor. The forum I was involved with benefited
28
29
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these compact negotiations will depend largely on the willingness of the state
judges to accept and treat the tribes as equal sovereigns within the United States
political system.35
Professor Robert Clinton once remarked that except for perhaps treaties,
no act of Congress has formerly or legitimately politically integrated Indian tribes
within the United States. 36 For sure, many attempts to integrate the tribes
geographically and politically within the United States political system have not
been legitimate. Supreme Court decisions such as Johnson v. M’Intosh37 integrated
all tribal lands within the geographical limits of the United States and then
appropriated them all. Other court decisions have held that Indian tribes and their
territories have been incorporated within the geographical and political boundaries
of the states.38 Other actions with integrative results have been the congressional
acts interfering with issues of internal tribal governance, or the citizenship of tribal
members such as the Act popularly known as the Indian Citizenship Act, which
made all Indians citizens of the United States without first asking them if this was
acceptable.39
Even though all such efforts with the exception of treaties may have been
illegitimate, it is undeniable that they have resulted in a certain amount of de facto
tremendously by the position of mutual respect held by the two co-chairs: Chief Justice Yazzie of the
Navajo Supreme Court and former Chief Justice Zimmerman of the Utah Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Hon. Michael F. Cavanagh, _Michigan’s Story: State and Tribal Courts Try to Do the Right
Thing, _76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 709 (1999).
36
See Clinton, supra note 21, at 845-50.
37
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
38
Tribal territories did not have to be considered within the political or geographical boundary of the
states any more than the territory of the Hopi Tribe is considered within the Navajo Nation’s boundary
just because it is surrounded by Navajo land. As a matter of fact, many federal acts incorporating new
states into the Union had specific provisions in them stating that the tribal territories would not become
part of any new State unless the tribes consented to it. The first case that interpreted such a clause held
that the territories of the Shoshone Indians were not within the territory of Idaho because there was such
an exclusion clause and the treaty signed with the Shoshones could not be interpreted as giving their
consent to be included. See Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476, 478 (1878). Two years later however in
Langston v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145, 146 (1880), the Court took a different approach and required that
treaties signed with tribes contain a specific clause excluding the tribal territory from the states. Many
tribes signed treaties before the creation of the federal territories or the incorporation of the new states,
therefore most treaties had no such specific exclusion clauses. From then on tribes were considered
included within the states unless specifically excluded while originally, they were excluded unless
specifically included.
39
I do not doubt that many Indians wanted United States citizenship and were proud of it. But many
were not. The issue here is not United States citizenship, the issue is whether a choice should have been
given to the tribes. Although Congress has much power to prevent people from becoming citizens, some
scholars have argued that it is at least questionable whether Congress really has the power to declare
people citizens without first asking them. At the time it was given, this unilateral grant of citizenship
was not in accord with at least some tribal laws. For instance, my own tribe’s 1881 constitution
proclaimed that you could not be a citizen of the Osage Nation if you were a citizen of any other nation,
including the United States. See THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE OSAGE
NATION 1881—1882, reprinted in THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE AMERICAN
INDIAN TRIBES XXXI, at 2 (Scholarly Resources, Inc.)(1975). The Osage Constitution did not talk in
terms of membership but of citizenship. Id. It seems that around that time, the early 1900’s, many
Indians lost their tribal citizenship and acquired tribal membership. I guess you can say they exchanged
their
passports
for
a
membership
card. See,
e.g., LAWS
RELATING TO OSAGE
TRIBE OF INDIANS, From May 18, 1824 to March 2, 1929, _reprinted in _THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES III, at 73 (Scholarly Resources, Inc.)(1973).
35
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integration.40 This article will not debate or take a position on whether the tribes
should be politically integrated.41 Instead, it will discuss some problems associated
with such integration.42 A good example underlying the importance of correctly
positioning tribes within the United States political system occurs when tribes
administer programs pursuant to federal law. This can be seen in the Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA) interpretation of the sections in the Clean Water Act
(CWA) 43 and the Clean Air Act (CAA), 44 allowing treatment of tribes as
states.45 The EPA took the position that under the CWA, the tribes will be treated
as states only if they can show that they have jurisdiction over all reservation
waters under principles of federal common law.46 As to the CAA, the EPA took the
position that it contained a delegation of federal authority to the tribe.47
I have previously argued that both programs should be considered as a
congressional reaffirmation of tribal sovereignty over reservations’ air and
water.48 If tribes are treated as states, then they should have at least the same
sovereignty as states. This means full sovereignty not only over their members but
also over their territories. I took this position because, as the Supreme Court’s
decision in Strate v. A-1 Contractors49 reminded some of us, having to prove tribal
jurisdiction under federal common law can be a difficult proposition, and the rules
of the game are subject to change without prior notice usually to the detriment of
tribes.
On the other hand, delegation of federal authority can be a dangerous
thing. Does it make the tribe an adjunct or an arm of the federal government? If
that is the case, it will definitely have an impact on the administration of tribal law
by the tribal courts. For one thing, it may mean that the United States Constitution
is fully applicable to tribal governments while they administer these delegated
programs. Some recent court decisions have raised puzzling questions. For
instance, in a recent state court decision, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida State
Department of Revenue,50 the Florida District Court of Appeals held that the tribe
was exempted from state sales and use taxes. The court determined that the tribe
40

But see Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 3, 51
(1987).
But see Porter, supra note 21, at 899.
42
Discussing integration implicates discussing the correct position and status of Indian tribes within the
constitutional framework. See Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary:
Opportunities and Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313 (1997).
43
33 U.S.C. § 1377(a)(1988).
44
42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1994).
45
33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(1988).
46
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 123.31, 501.22 (1999); see generally James M. Grijalva, _Tribal Governmental
Regulation of Non-Indian Polluters of Reservation Waters, _71 N. D. L. REV. 433 (1995).
47
See Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(1995); Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63
Fed. Reg. 7254 (1998); s_ee generally_ William H. Gelles, Tribal Regulatory Authority Under the
Clean Air Act, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 363 (1997). The EPA’s interpretation of the “Tribes as States” section
of the Clean Water Act was upheld in Montana v. E.P.A., 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998). The EPA’s
interpretation of a similar section in the Clean Air Act was upheld in Arizona Public Service Company
v. E.P.A.,27 ILR 2163 (2000).
48
See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Chevron Doctrine in Federal Indian Law and the Agencies’ Duty to
Interpret Legislation in Favor of Indians: Did the EPA Reconcile the Two in Interpreting the “Tribes As
States” Section of the Clean Water Act?, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 15, 38 (1998).
49
520 U.S. 438 (1997).
50
720 So.2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
41

8/15/18 1:54 AM

8

Tribal Law Journal

Vol. 1

functioned as a federal instrumentality since it provided services which otherwise
would be provided by the federal government. 51 Similarly, in United States v.
Smith,52 the Tenth Circuit held that because the police chief of the Osage Tribe was
acting as a federal officer when he was attacked, his assailant could be convicted of
the crime of assaulting a federal police officer. The Tenth Circuit was of the
opinion that when arresting someone for disorderly conduct, the Osage Tribal
police chief was enforcing federal law because he was acting pursuant to a selfdetermination contract entered between the tribe and the federal government
pursuant to P.L. 93-638.53 The Tenth Circuit cited as authority United States v.
Young,54 where the court held that while not every person employed to carry a 638
contract is acting pursuant to a grant of authority from the Department of the
Interior, a police officer was because he was performing activities which otherwise
would be performed by the BIA police. Although before they became selfgovernance contracts, 638 contracts used to be considered procurement
contracts,55 it was never proper to view 638 contracts as tribes assuming a federal
function. For one thing, to the extent that these functions concern internal tribal
self-governance, the federal government should not be considered as having the
power to interfere with these tribal powers, at least not without tribal consent.56
In Thomas v. United States,57 some tribal members were challenging a
Secretary of the Interior’s decision not to recognize a tribal election. The Secretary
argued that the case should be dismissed because the current tribal government,
which supported the action of the Secretary, was an indispensable party under Rule
19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures but could not be joined against its
will because of tribal sovereign immunity.58 The Court held that the election to
amend the tribal constitution was a federal election because the Secretary, pursuant
to congressional legislation, conducted it.59 The tribe, as represented by the current
tribal leadership, was therefore not an indispensable party under Rule 19(b). If a
tribal election conducted by the Secretary of the Interior is a federal election, does
it follow that the people elected pursuant to such elections are federal officials in
the same manner that the Osage tribal police chief was found to be a federal police
officer because he was executing federal laws? Is the determination that such tribal
officer could be deemed a federal officer based on a finding that he was executing
delegated federal authority?
51

Id.
194 F.3d 1321 (10th Cir. 1999).
53
Because the police chief was acting under 25 USC 2804(a) he could be considered a federal officer
under 18 USC 111.
54
85 F.3d 334, 335 (8th Cir. 1996).
55
These are the same type of contracts that anyone procuring a service for the federal government, such
as for instance building an airplane for the army, has to entered into.
56
This reminds me of an opinion written by Browning Pipestem right after his appointment as
a CFR court judge in Oklahoma. Just like some of the early opinions of Justice Marshall concerning the
power of federal courts, Browning was attempting to lay the foundation for the CFR Court’s power in
Indian Country. He took the position that the only way the CFR courts could legitimately assume power
over tribal members was with the consent of the tribes. Under his theory, the CFR courts were in fact
acting pursuant to a delegation of tribal authority. I think he was right. The BIA should not be viewed as
having the power to impose CFR courts on their members without tribal consent.
57
189 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 1999).
58
Id. at 666.
59
Id. at 667-68.
52
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The decisions just discussed above set dangerous precedents in that they
contribute to the integration of Indian tribes not as much into the United States
political system as into the federal government itself. If courts start to view tribes
as federal instrumentalities or as only exercising delegated federal authorities,
tribes will eventually lose the “inherent” attributes of their sovereignty, which is
what set them apart from any other local government within the United States. In
other words, they stand to lose the uniquely “tribal” or “native” component of their
sovereignty. For this reason, the next section argues that it is better to view certain
recent acts of Congress as accomplishing a “reaffirmation” of inherent tribal
sovereignty rather than a congressional delegation of federal authority to the tribes.
B. Resolving the Delegation v. Reaffirmation of Tribal Authority Conundrum:
Starting in 1978 with the decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe,60 the Supreme Court has adopted the implicit divestiture doctrine according
to which Indian tribes are said to have been implicitly divested of any inherent
sovereign power if such power is inconsistent with their status as domestic
dependent nations.61 Pursuant to the doctrine, tribes have been judicially divested
first of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, 62 and then over non-member
Indians.63 In the absence of consensual relations, tribes have also been divested of
the power to regulate the activities of nonmembers on nonmember fee lands within
Indian reservations unless such activities can be said to have a serious and direct
impact on the tribe’s health and welfare, political integrity or economic
security.64 More recently, the Supreme Court held that tribal courts have been
divested of civil jurisdiction over any law suits involving nonmember defendants
for any activity which occurred on lands over which the tribe has lost its “right to
exclude” unless the tribe could show that such jurisdiction was needed to allow
tribal members to make their own laws and be ruled by them.65
Although there have been some disagreements among scholars, the
Supreme Court has expressed the view many times that following a judicial
divestment of tribal jurisdiction, a tribe could only regain authority pursuant to a
congressional delegation of federal authority.66 For instance, in Oliphant, the Court
stated that “[a]n examination of our earlier precedents satisfies us that, even
ignoring treaty provisions and congressional policy, Indians do not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such power by
Congress.”67 In Duro v. Reina,68 the Court took the position that since a tribal
criminal prosecution over a non-member Indian was “a manifestation of external
60
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Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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See, e.g., L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising Sovereignty
and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53 (1994); Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent legislation to
Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109 (1992).
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435 U.S. at 208 (emphasis added).
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95 U.S. 676 (1990).
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relations between the Tribe and outsiders, such power would have been
inconsistent with the Tribe’s dependent status, and could only have come to the
Tribe by delegation from Congress, subject to the constraints of the
Constitution.”69 Finally in the realm of civil jurisdiction, Justice Thomas in South
Dakota v. Bourland 70 endorsed the statement first made in Montana v. United
States [ 71 ] by asserting that the dissent “shuts both eyes to the reality that
after Montana, tribal sovereignty over nonmembers ‘cannot survive
without express congressional delegation’ and is therefore not inherent.”72
Congress was not impressed by such judicial verbiage when it decided to
overturn the Court’s decision in Duro by recognizing and reaffirming the inherent
power of Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians within their
reservations. 73 Recently however, in Means v. Northern Cheyenne Tribal
Court, 74 the Ninth Circuit expressed the view that Congressional legislation
allowing Indian tribes to prosecute nonmember Indians, the so-called Durofix legislation,75 was a delegation of federal authority to the tribes.76 Although the
Ninth Circuit held that the Duro-fix was not applicable in Means because Congress
did not intend such legislation to be applied retroactively, it indicated in a footnote
that had such been the case, serious equal protection questions would arise because
non-member Indians would be subject to tribal jurisdiction but not nonIndians.77 The Ninth Circuit further observed that there would also be serious due
process questions concerning the power of Congress to delegate authority
subjecting United States citizens to be prosecuted without all the protections of the
Bill of Rights.78 Similarly, a panel for the Eight Circuit held that double jeopardy
barred federal prosecution of an Indian who had already been prosecuted by a tribe
pursuant to the Duro legislation because such legislation amounted to a delegation
of federal authority to the tribe.79
Whenever tribal jurisdiction over non-members is contingent on some
kind of congressional legislation, does this automatically mean that the tribes are
exercising delegated federal authority or can it still be said that they are exercising
inherent authority which has been somewhat reaffirmed and supported by
Congress? Although Congress clearly intended to reaffirm tribal powers lost as a
result of Duro, the intent of Congress is not always that clear.
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Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
508 U.S. 679 (1993).
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450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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508 U.S. at 695 n.15 (emphasis added) (citing Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
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25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994) (amending the Indian Civil Rights Act by adding the following to the
definition of “powers of self-government”; “means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”).
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154 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1998).
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See 25 U.S.C. 1301 (1983).
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Means, 154 F.3d at 946 (stating “once the Supreme Court has ruled that the law is ‘X,’ Congress can
come back and say, “no, the law is ‘Y,’” but it cannot say that the law was never ‘X’ or always ‘Y.’”).
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Id. at n.7.
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United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 1998). However, the district court decision
to the contrary was reinstated by an equally divided en banc court in a cursory per curiam
order. See U.S. v. Weaselhead, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999).
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The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Mazurie, [80] indicates
that the Court may be predisposed to treat any tribal assumption of jurisdiction
based upon an underlying act of Congress as a delegation of authority to the tribes
and not a confirmation of tribal authority. 81 The Court in Mazurie held that
Congress could validly delegate to the tribes the authority to regulate liquor
transactions on the reservation even if such transactions occurred on non-Indian fee
land within the reservation.82 What is surprising, however, was that the act in
question was treated and presumed to be a delegation of federal authority to the
tribes. None of the Justices even raised the possibility that it could be an
affirmation or recognition of tribal sovereignty. The statute at issue provided that
certain federal laws prohibiting liquor transactions on Indian reservations would
not be applicable if such “transaction is in conformity both with the laws of the
State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted
by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country.”83
Treating such legislation as a delegation of federal authority to the tribes
could pose several problems that, at least in the mind of some scholars, would not
exist if the legislation were treated as a “reaffirmation” of tribal authority.84 To
begin with, there are questions concerning the extent of Congress’ power to
delegate authority over certain non-member activities to the tribes. For instance,
in Mazurie,85 the Court acknowledged that there are limits on the authority of
Congress to delegate its legislative power but held that “[t]hose limitations are,
however, less stringent in cases where the entity exercising the delegated authority
itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter.” 86 The Court
concluded that the power to regulate liquor transactions on the reservation could be
delegated to the tribe because the tribe had “independent authority over matters that
affect the internal and social relations of tribal life. Clearly the distribution and use
of intoxicants is just such a matter.”87 However, if a court finds that a tribe does not
have jurisdiction over certain activities by non-members because such activities do
not affect the internal and social relations of tribal life, an argument can be made
that the tribes may not have the necessary degree of independent authority to allow
a congressional delegation of authority over such activity.88
Furthermore, there are serious questions whether tribe scan act pursuant to
delegated federal authority without affording affected individuals the full
protection of the United States Constitution. While it is true that pursuant to its
80
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Indian commerce power, Congress can criminally prosecute non-member Indians
on Indian reservations, Congress may not be able to delegate what it does not have
and since it does not have the power to prosecute such non-members without
affording them the protection of the Constitution, it is highly questionable whether
it should be able to have the power to authorize the tribes to do that very
thing.89 Although I have previously argued that legislation such as the Duro-fix
should be able to constitutionally survive an equal protection challenge even if
treated as a “delegation” of authority, 90 I believe that any such delegation
legislation subjecting United States citizens to tribal criminal prosecution without
the full protection of the Bill of Rights would face a serious constitutional
challenge.91 It seems, therefore, that it would be prudent for Congress to provide
that in exercising such delegated powers, tribes would have to afford all the
constitutional protections normally available to all persons affected by federal or
state governmental actions.92
Aware of the potential problems involved with any legislation delegating
federal authority to the tribes, Professor Philip Frickey in a recent article took the
position that Congress acted clearly within its power when it reaffirmed tribal
authority in the Duro-fix legislation.93 To illustrate his point, he gave the example
of a state that was denied the right to regulate the length of semi-trailer trucks by a
federal court on the ground that it unduly burdened interstate
commerce. 94 According to Frickey, if Congress were then to enact legislation
authorizing the state to regulate the length of such trucks, the state would be
regulating pursuant to its police power and not pursuant to delegated federal
authority.95 The same result should obtain when tribes reassert criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to the Duro-fix legislation.96
89
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Some may question Professor Frickey’s clever analogy because the
Constitution does not treat tribes the same as it treats states. Thus, a state can
regulate truck lengths pursuant to its own police power because the Constitution
recognizes that states have such powers unless it is pre-empted due to a conflict
with a power constitutionally assigned to Congress. As Professor Frickey himself
observed, the state police power has always existed, it was only temporarily preempted by federal common law because pre-emption was deemed inconsistent with
the power of Congress to regulate commerce.97 Unlike the states whose limited
sovereignty is recognized and guaranteed in the Constitution, the tribes’
sovereignty is neither fully acknowledged nor preserved in the Constitution.98
Nonetheless, this article agrees with Professor Frickey’s position that
judicially divested tribal powers should be treated as having been pre-empted by
federal common law until Congress consents to the tribal exercise of such powers.
These judicially divested tribal powers could even be conceptualized as being held
in trust by the United States for the benefit of the tribes. For instance, in the first
Supreme Court decision to ever mention and recognize tribal sovereign immunity
from suit, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]hese Indian nations are exempt from
suit without Congressional authorization. It is as though the immunity which was
theirs as sovereigns passed to the United States for their benefit, as their tribal
properties did.”99 Just as a tribal decision to lease or sell tribal trust lands to
nonmembers has to be approved by the federal government, cases such as
Duro 100 can be viewed as requiring that a tribal decision to assume criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers has to be somehow condoned or approved by the
federal government.101 In some fashion, tribal inherent powers that have been
judicially divested can be conceived as being in a state of suspended animation
until Congress gives some kind of indication that such tribal powers can be
reactivated.
For all these reasons, it seems that the courts could legitimately hold that
Congress can enact legislation confirming or reaffirming the existence of tribal

same statute at issue in Mazurie, also delegated federal authority to the state to regulate liquor
transactions on Indian reservations. Yet earlier in the opinion, the Court had described section 1161 as
a federal authorization for the states to assume jurisdiction. Id. at 726. Under professor Frickey’s
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97
Frickey, supra note 92.
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Constitution, 60 MONT. L. REV. 3 (1999).

8/15/18 1:54 AM

14

Tribal Law Journal

Vol. 1

authority over nonmembers. For instance, in United States v. Enas, [102] the Ninth
Circuit held that the Duro-fix legislation was recognition of inherent tribal
sovereignty and not a delegation of federal authority to the tribes because:
It is well established that Congress may deal with the special problems
facing Indians using its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause. Congress
may alter the scope of tribal power as set forth by the Supreme Court if the Court
determines that scope as a matter of federal common law; it can do so because
Congress has legislative authority over federal common law. See Milwaukee v.
Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1981). Additionally, we note that
Congress may recognize a power without being the source of that power. See
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328 (1978).103
IV. Conclusion
It is crucial for tribal courts not to become just an extension or appendage
of federal courts. 104 The Supreme Court’s recent application of the implicit
divestiture doctrine may place the tribes and those in Congress who support an
inherent vision of tribal sovereignty between a rock and a hard place if the Court’s
jurisprudence is interpreted as preventing Congress from affirming the previous
existence of a sovereignty subsequently found to have been divested by the Court.
Let me conclude by invoking the closing ceremony at a conference I
recently attended at St. Thomas University in Miami. A Mayan holy man
conducted the ceremony. He started speaking in Mayan but at one point switched to
Latin and his words reminded me of words used in Catholic mass. Afterwards, I
asked his assistant what this was all about and whether the ceremony was truly
Mayan. She said that at the level of spirituality that this holy man was operating, it
did not matter what language he was speaking. His Mayan religion was strong
enough to incorporate some Catholic concepts. The important thing here is that the
process of incorporation was done by a Mayan according to the Mayan way.
It is not for me to tell tribes how “tribal” the tribal laws and courts should
be and whether they should or should not pursue “integration” within the United
States political system and if so, under what conditions. What I do believe is that
the tribes should be the ones deciding and they will not be free to truly decide until
both the states and federal government respect their sovereignty and let them
decide pursuant to a tribal process.

102

27 ILR 2083 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 2084-85 (some citations omitted).
104
As recently stated by Professor Christine Zuni, “… to the extent that tribal justice systems pattern
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